


































































































































Contributions to tax-preferred savings accounts are typically constrained by a contribution
limit. These limits inﬂuence contributions not just in periods in which they bind, but in other
periods as well. I develop a simple life-cycle model in which consumers exhibit “use-it-or-lose-it”
contribution behaviour. This connects current contributions to future contribution limits, which
leads to the result that an increase in contribution limits can decrease contributions. Empirical
evidence provides support for the model - larger future contribution room is associated with
smaller contributions.
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11 Introduction
Several countries allow preferential tax treatment for contributions made to special savings accounts,
such as 401(k) plans in the United States or Registered Retirement Savings Plans in Canada. A
literature has developed examining the eﬀects of this type of tax preference on consumers’ savings
and consumption choices.1 Gravelle (1991) notes that interpretation of this evidence has been
hampered by shortcomings in the understanding of how consumers plan contributions through
time. Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) conclude that the empirical evidence suggests tax policy has
its strongest eﬀect upon the timing of economic transactions. Thus, timing considerations are
not well understood, but are potentially very important. In this paper, I address one aspect of
the decision to contribute to tax-preferred savings accounts. Speciﬁcally, I consider the inﬂuence
of contribution limits on the decision to contribute, and show how changes in the structure of
contribution limits aﬀect contributions.
Tax-preferred savings accounts generally take the following form. Contributions are deductible
for income tax purposes, up to some limit set by the tax authority. Interest on the accumulating
stock of contributions accrues tax-free. Finally, withdrawn funds are added to taxable income in the
year of withdrawal. In the United States, Individual Retirement Accounts and 401(k) plans conform
to this structure, as do Registered Retirement Savings Plans in Canada, and Personal Pensions in
the United Kingdom. Many important details of tax treatment vary across countries, however.
For example, withdrawals from Individual Retirement Accounts in the United States before age
59.5 attract a ten percent penalty, while withdrawals from Registered Retirement Savings Plans
in Canada do not. These diﬀering institutional details may inﬂuence contributions, but are not
central to the focus of this paper.
Previous work has explored the intertemporal nature of the contribution decision. Daly (1981),
and Androkovich, Daly, and Naqib (1992) develop a dynamic model to explain the optimal path of
contributions to tax-preferred savings accounts. In the model, they ﬁnd that an optimal path for
contributions performs a tax base smoothing role, allowing a consumer to minimize his lifetime tax
bill. Ragan (1994) constructs a two-period model to look at the eﬀect of progressive income taxes on
savings when tax-preferred savings accounts are available, then uses the model to explore diﬀerences
between this system and a conventional consumption tax. Shoven and Sialm (1999) present a model
1Bernheim (1999) reviews the empirical literature examining the degree to which contributions to tax-preferred
savings accounts represent new savings rather than mere portfolio reallocations.
2of asset allocation when choosing between tax-preferred and taxable savings accounts. Their model
calculates optimal allocations based on the diﬀerences between the two types of accounts in risk
and tax treatment of diﬀerent forms of income.
Absent from these models is adequate consideration of the inﬂuence of contribution limits on the
contribution decision. In this paper, I build a simple three period model in which a consumer saves
for retirement through two assets, each receiving diﬀerent tax treatment. When future contributions
to the tax-preferred asset are constrained by a contribution limit, current contributions increase
in order to make use of the contribution room while it is available. This is the “use-it-or-lose-it”
motivation to contribute. In an extension, I allow unused contribution room to be carried forward
for use in future periods. With this structure, the use-it-or-lose-it eﬀect on contributions diminishes,
and in some cases can disappear.
Following the development of the model, I examine empirically the relationship between current
contributions and future limits. Using administrative data collected from tax returns, I follow
a panel of Canadian tax ﬁlers through a period in which Registered Retirement Savings Plan
contribution limits underwent a reform. This makes possible an empirical comparison among
those who received diﬀerent treatment under the reform. I ﬁnd evidence in support of an inverse
relationship between future contribution limits and current contributions.
The paper proceeds as follows. I ﬁrst discuss the basic model and the carry-forward extension
in Section 2. This is followed in Section 3 by a description of Registered Retirement Savings Plans
and presentation of empirical evidence relating changes in contributions to changes in contribution
limits. The paper then concludes with a brief discussion.
2 The Model
2.1 No limits
A simple partial equilibrium three period life-cycle framework provides suﬃcient structure to ex-
plore several aspects of the inﬂuence of contribution limits on contributions. To begin the analysis
I set up a benchmark model without contribution limits.2 In periods 1 and 2, the consumer is
endowed with exogenous income y1 and y2. In period 3, the consumer retires, earns no income, and
consumes all savings. In the ﬁrst two periods, unconsumed income may be saved in one of two forms,
2This model borrows from Androkovich, Daly, and Naqib (1992).
3diﬀering only in their tax treatment. Contributions to the registered asset Rt are deductible from
income for tax purposes, while savings allocated to the non-registered asset Nt are not. Amounts
withdrawn from the registered asset at retirement in period 3 are added to taxable income in that
period. Both asset types earn the safe interest rate r in each period.3 Interest earned on Rt is
not taxed as it accrues, but interest on Nt is taxed in each period. Thus, the tax base zt in each
period comprises the exogenous income for the period plus interest on the stock of non-registered
savings, less net new contributions to the registered asset.4 This base is taxed according to a ﬁxed,
smooth and progressive tax function  satisfying 0  0(zt)  1 and 00 (zt) > 0.5 Utility is derived
from consumption ct in each period according to a standard time separable concave utility function.
Finally, future utility is discounted at the rate , with 0 <  < 1.
This setup diﬀers from the tax structure of most countries in at least three noteworthy ways.
First, I do not explicitly rule out short positions in R. Because there is no income in period 3,
tax base smoothing alone would make consumers want to make positive contributions in periods
1 and 2. So, if income in the ﬁrst two periods were large enough, short positions would not be
optimal. Second, I assume that interest on short positions of N is tax deductible. Tax-deductible
interest on borrowing makes consumers more willing to borrow in order to ﬁnance contributions
to tax-preferred savings accounts than if no deduction for interest were allowed. However, it will
be shown that the key result does not depend on this assumption. Finally, the restriction on the
tax function to be strictly convex is at odds with observed income tax schedules, which tend to
follow step functions through tax brackets. Furthermore, income-tested tax credits and transfers
add ‘bubbles’ to the marginal tax rate schedule, which can lead to the violation of the assumption
that the marginal tax rate is strictly increasing.6 The assumptions on the tax function ensure that
contributions are an increasing function of income, which greatly simpliﬁes the analysis.
This can be summarized in the following problem. The consumer maximizes utility by allocating
3The average return of assets in tax preferred accounts may earn a diﬀerent rate of return than assets held in
taxable forms. For example, the assets may have diﬀerent risk characteristics (Shoven and Sialm 1999) or be subject
to investment restrictions (Milligan and Smart 2000). A generalization to allow diﬀerent rates of returns would
complicate the analysis, but not change the nature of the results.
4An algebraic description of the tax-base for periods 1 to 3 appears in equations (5) to (7). In this setup, the
investor pays tax on interest out of ordinary income, rather than out of the proceeds of the interest itself. This
corresponds with a tax system in which tax on capital income is not withheld at source.
5From here forward,  (zt) will be written as t in order to simplify notation.
6Income-testing for pension and other beneﬁts can lead to retirees facing higher marginal tax rates when withdraw-
ing funds from a tax preferred savings account than when working. Shillington (1999) and Poschman and Richards
(2000) document this for Canada.
4savings to the registered and the non-registered assets in periods 1 and 2, subject to the constraints
deﬁned by (2) to (7). Consumption and taxable income are determined endogenously through the








c1 = y1   (z1)  R1  N1 (2)
c2 = y2   (z2)  R2  N2 (3)
c3 = (1 + r)
2 (R1 + N1) + (1 + r)(R2 + N2)   (z3) (4)
z1 = y1  R1 (5)
z2 = y2  R2 + rN1 (6)
z3 = (1 + r)[(1 + r)R1 + R2] + r[(1 + r)N1 + N2] (7)
Consumption in the ﬁrst two periods is the residual from income after paying taxes and making
savings choices for assets R and N. In the third period, the terminal value of all assets, less the
tax payment, is consumed. Taxable income in each period is the endowment income y less the
contribution to R plus the interest that has accrued on N.
Substitution of (2) to (7) directly into the objective function (1) transforms this into an un-
constrained optimization problem. The derivatives of U with respect to the four choice variables
(R1;R2;N1;N2) imply the following ﬁrst order necessary conditions:






















(1 + r) (9)
N1 : u0 (c1) + u0 (c2)0
2r = u0 (c3)3 (1 + r)2 (10)
N2 : u0 (c2) = u0 (c3)3; (11)









5The second order conditions for a maximum will be satisﬁed because of the assumption of a strictly
concave utility function.














(1 + r) (13)
u0 (c1) = u0 (c2)2 (14)
u0 (c2) = u0 (c3)3: (15)
Equations (12) and (13) are no-arbitrage conditions for the allocation of saving between periods 1
and 3, and periods 2 and 3 respectively.7 In each case, the return to taxable saving is on the left-hand
side, and the return to saving through the registered asset is on the right-hand side. Contributions to
the tax-preferred asset will be made up to the point at which the return to a marginal investment
in either asset is identical. Equations (14) and (15) are Euler equations describing the path of
consumption between periods 1 and 2, and periods 2 and 3. In these equations, the growth of
consumption is governed by the after-tax rate of return , even though a tax-preferred asset oﬀering
the before-tax rate of return is available. This occurs because the consumer optimally contributes
to the tax-preferred account, then borrows at  to reach the desired level of consumption. Thus,
this feature of the solution is an artifact of the assumption that borrowing may be made at the
after-tax rate of interest. Together, these four equations implicitly deﬁne the solution for the choice
of (R1;R2;N1;N2) that provides the utility maximizing amounts of consumption.
Further manipulation provides a solution analogous to Androkovich, Daly, and Naqib (1992).
Both sides of (13) are multiplied by (1  0
1) and substituted into (12), so that the optimal rate of






7These equations can also be manipulated to provide an analogous no-arbitrage condition for saving between
periods 1 and 2: 2 = (1 + r) (10
2)
(10
1). This does not appear as part of the solution, as it is redundant.
6Because 2 > 1, (16) means that the marginal tax rate will follow an increasing path through time.
This has an intuitive interpretation. Standard tax base smoothing equates marginal tax rates
through time, so that an increment of income received in any period will face the same marginal
rate, which allows the consumer to minimize his lifetime tax bill. In (16), however, the desire to
smooth the tax base (the left-hand side), is traded oﬀ against the taxation of interest income on
the taxable asset (the right-hand side).
2.2 With Limits
The model presented above ignores a key institutional fact: contributions to tax-preferred savings
accounts are constrained by contribution limits. In the United States, for example, Individual
Retirement Account contributions are limited to $2000 for eligible taxpayers.8 In Canada, Reg-
istered Retirement Savings Plan annual contribution limits increase with earned income, but are
capped at C$13,500. Similar regulations exist in other countries, as well. When contribution limits
are incorporated into the model, several interesting results emerge. Current contributions must
now reﬂect the constraints on contributions in future periods. This makes the consumer want to
make use of contribution room while it is available. This use-it-or-lose-it motivation to contribute
contrasts with the tax base smoothing motivation described above for the no-limit case.
In this section, the model changes through the introduction of a contribution limit Lt for each
period. This adds an extra constraint to the problem:
Rt  Lt:
To analyze the eﬀect of the limit on contributions, four cases must be considered. First, the
limit could be binding in both periods 1 and 2. In this case, the consumer is no longer able to choose
R1 and R2. Increases in the limit in one period may increase contributions in that period, but will
not be able to aﬀect contributions in the other period. Second, if the limit is not binding in either
period, then the consumer’s behaviour when confronted with limit changes is no diﬀerent than in
the no-limit model. The more interesting cases arise when the limit is binding in one period but
not the other. When this holds, changes to the limit in the constrained period aﬀect contributions
in the unconstrained period.
8See Burman, Cordes, and Ozanne (1990) for a more complete description of the eligibility rules for IRAs.
7I focus on the case with contributions constrained in period 2 but unconstrained in period 1.9
The model changes by replacing R2 with L2 in (3), (4), (6), and (7). The ﬁrst order condition
(9) changes as R2 is constrained by the limit. For the solution, this means that the no-arbitrage
condition for saving between periods 2 and 3 no longer holds with equality:





(1 + r): (17)
The remaining equations (12), (14), and (15) implicitly deﬁne the solution for (R1;N1;N2) when
R2 is constrained by L2.
The inﬂuence of the limit on contributions can be seen more clearly by rearranging the ﬁrst
order conditions. First, deﬁne 0 as the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint L2 R2  0. This
can be written as the diﬀerence between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (9):











This expression is combined with (8) through substitution for u0 (c3). After dividing each side by
u0 (c2)(1  0








(1 + r) +
0 (1 + r)
u0 (c2)(1  0
1)
: (19)















 (1 + r): (21)
The solution for the case without limits in equation (16) can be rewritten to provide an intuitive
comparison of the solutions.







The solution without limits in (160) sets the marginal tax rate in period 1 equal to the tax rate in
period 2, discounted by the after-tax rate of return. With limits in place, the solution represented
in (21) appears similar to the no-limit case, but with the right-hand side now reduced by a term
reﬂecting the cost of being constrained by the limit.
The solution facilitates the analysis of an interesting question: what happens to contributions
when limits change? Before approaching this question formally, an informal examination of (21)
hints at the answer. Holding everything else constant, increasing the limit in period 2 shrinks
the cost of being constrained by the limit, 0. This increases the right-hand side of (21), which
necessitates a decrease in R1 to bring about an increase in 0
1 on the left-hand side of (21) in order
to maintain the equality. Thus, an increase in the limit decreases the cost of being constrained,
which leads to a decrease in R1.
To conﬁrm this result formally, the three equations comprising the solution ((12), (14), and
(15)) are used to form three implicit functions of the endogenous choice variables x = (R1;N1;N2),












F2 (x;L2;)  u0 (c1)  u0 (c2)2 = 0 (23)
F3 (x;L;)  u0 (c2)  u0 (c3)3 = 0 (24)
Proposition 1 If R2 = L2, then contributions in period 1 move inversely with the limit in period
2: dR1
dL2 < 0:
Proof. By Cramer’s rule. See Appendix A.
When the limit increases, a larger contribution may be made in period 2. This diminishes the
need of the consumer to “use it or lose it,” which decreases R1. Because this result does not require
restrictions on r, it also holds when r = 0. This is noteworthy because there is no advantage to
interest deductibility when r = 0. This indicates that the result does not depend on the interest
deductibility assumption.
9In standard life-cycle models of consumption, an increase in income leads to an increase in
consumption in all periods, so long as marginal utility is decreasing. This implies that an increase in
income early in life will increase savings in order to provide for more future consumption. Similarly,
an increase in income later in life will lead to a decrease in savings in order to allow for more early
consumption. Within the present model, the response of the allocation of savings between the
registered and the non-registered asset to changes in income can be addressed. Using the solution
described in the equations above, I ﬁnd the comparative statics derivatives of saving with respect
to changes in income.
Proposition 2 If 00





Proposition 3 If 00
23 (1  0
3) > 00
32 (1  0
2) then dR1
dy2 > 0; dN1
dy2 < 0.
Proof. By Cramer’s rule. See appendix A.
The sign of the derivative in Proposition 2 is intuitive. Greater income leads to a desire to
consume more in the future through an income eﬀect, leading to greater savings. The restrictions
are necessary to ensure that the tax beneﬁt of contributing more does not outweigh the cost. An
increased contribution lowers taxable income in periods 1 and 2 by lowering the amount of interest
that is included in the taxable income in those periods. However, it increases the taxable income
in period 3 when the withdrawal from the registered asset is added to taxable income. If the
tax rate in period 3 increases “too” quickly (meaning that 00
3 is large), then a larger contribution
would not lower lifetime taxes. The derivative dN1
dy1 cannot be signed unambiguously without strong
restrictions. This means that the change in overall savings in period 1 from an increase in y1 cannot
be signed.
When y2 increases, Proposition (3) shows that R1 will increase and N1 will decrease, if the
suﬃcient condition holds. For the same reasons as above, the consumer wishes to contribute to R1
so long as the decrease in taxes in period 2 is greater than the increase in taxes in period 3. If
R were the only asset, an increase in future income would lead to a decrease in current saving in
order to facilitate more current consumption. However, in this model with two assets, the amount
contributed to R increases as y2 increases, when the necessary conditions are satisﬁed. Any decrease
in period 1 savings must take place through the non-registered asset N.
This model provides a setting in which the use-it-or-lose-it motivation plays a pivotal role in the
contribution decision. This gives rise to several implications. First, when the future contribution
10limit is binding, an increase in that limit will cause current contributions to fall. Second, changes
in income may have counterintuitive eﬀects on contributions to the registered asset. This model
proves useful for the analysis of certain types of policy changes. As an example, I use the model to
analyse the eﬀects of a carry-forward provision on contributions.
2.3 Carry-forward Limits
In both Canada and the United Kingdom, any diﬀerence between a consumer’s contribution and the
contribution limit may be carried forward for use in future years.10 By 1996, Canadian taxpayers
had accumulated over C$179 billion in contribution room, or $10,740 per tax ﬁler. This was equal
to 37 percent of taxable income in that year (Revenue Canada 1998). The implications of this limit
structure for contributions have not been well explored.11
In this section, I extend the model to consider a provision allowing for the carry-forward of
unused contribution room. The carry-forward is integrated with the model in the following way.
Unused contribution room from period 1, calculated as the allowed limit L1 less the chosen con-
tribution R1, can be carried forward. In period 2, the consumer may contribute the allowed limit
for that period plus the unused room from period 1.12 To make the problem more general, assume
that the stock of unused room grows at the gross rate , so that one dollar of contribution room
carried forward from the period 1 provides  dollars of extra contribution room in period 2. The
constraint on second period contributions becomes
R2  L2 + (L1  R1):
The consumer now must contemplate how a contribution in period 1 will change the constraint
















(1 + r)(1 + r  ): (25)
This, combined with (10) and (11), provides the ﬁrst order conditions for the problem.
10In Canada the carry-forward was initially limited to seven years when introduced in 1991, but was expanded to
an indeﬁnite carry-forward in 1996. In the United Kingdom, unused contribution room for Personal Pensions may
be carried forward for six years, and carried back for one year.
11Gupta, Venti, and Wise (1994) present predictions of the future path of aggregate RRSP contributions with
a carry-forward provision. However, their simulations are based on the assumption that the introduction of the
carry–forward does not change contribution behaviour.
12In Canada, the deduction need not be taken in the same year as the contribution is made, but instead may be
carried forward. This feature is not captured within the present model.
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Again, I analyze the solution through solving for 0
1. Equation (18) is used to substitute for






















 (1 + r  ): (27)
Three interesting cases can be generated from (27) by choosing diﬀerent values for . If  = 0, there
is no carry-forward. In this case, (27) reproduces the result from (21) without the carry-forward.
The case for which  = 1 corresponds to the standard concept of a carry-forward provision - room
is carried forward dollar for nominal dollar. Compared to the case without the carry-forward, the
inﬂuence of the  term diminishes sharply, as it is now premultiplied only by r. Finally, if  = 1+r,
the  term vanishes. Here, the result appears identical to the no-limit case in equation (22). These
are summarized in Table 1.
The third case ( = 1+r) occurs if interest were paid on the accumulating stock of contribution
room at the same rate earned by savings. Here, a dollar of contribution not made in this period
can always be made next period without hitting the limit. This frees the consumer from the need
to make a higher contribution in the current period to account for being constrained in the future.
However, this does not mean that the consumer becomes indiﬀerent between contributing in period
1 versus period 2, since the interest on non-registered savings will be taxable. Rather, the consumer
is returned from being concerned with adjusting contributions to reﬂect being constrained in the
12future to being concerned solely with the trade-oﬀ described in equation (16) between tax base
smoothing and tax-exempt accrual.
3 Evidence
To explore the implications of Proposition 1, I analyze contributions to Registered Retirement
Savings Plans (RRSPs) in Canada. Contribution limits for RRSPs underwent a reform in 1990
and in 1991, and these reforms had diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent groups of taxpayers. I identify
four such “treatment” groups, and compare their contribution behaviour to other contributors who
act as “control” groups. In this section, I ﬁrst provide some background on RRSP contributions,
contribution limits, and the reforms to the contribution limits. Next, I describe in more detail the
empirical strategy. This leads to a description of the data set used for the estimation, followed by
the presentation of the results.
Contributions to RRSPs receive the following tax treatment. Contributions are deductible
from income for tax purposes, and income within an RRSP accrues tax-free. When funds are
withdrawn, the full amount is added to taxable income for that year. Until 1996, contributions
could be made until age 71, when a planned series of withdrawals must begin.13 In contrast with
IRAs, early withdrawals from RRSPs attract no penalty.14 RRSP contributions are subject to a
contribution limit. Through the 1980s, the RRSP contribution limit was calculated as 20 percent
of earned income, up to a prescribed maximum ($7,500 from 1986 to 1990). This maximum limit
diﬀered for members of employment based pension plans - called Registered Pension Plans (RPPs).
The contributions of RPP members were capped at $3,500, less any employee contribution to the
RPP. Special provisions also existed for those receiving pension income. Each dollar of pension
income could be “rolled over” into an RRSP, which eﬀectively increased the contribution limit of
pensioners by the annual amount of their pensions. Finally, eligible lump sum retirement allowances
and transfers can be deducted in some circumstances.15
From 1982 to 1990, aggregate annual contributions to RRSPs grew from $2.1 billion to $4.1
13This age was changed to 69 in 1996.
14Even though there is no penalty for early withdrawal, there remains asymmetry between contributions and
withdrawals - a withdrawal does not replenish contribution limits. This may still make consumers reluctant to
withdraw.
15Two types of transfers into RRSPs are possible. In some cases, the transfer does not have to appear as income,
and so is not eligible for a deduction. In other cases, the transfer receives ‘in and out’ treatment, meaning that it
appears as income, but then is deducted.
13billion. The stock of RRSP savings jumped from $32.6 billion in 1983 to $129.3 billion in 1991
(Statistics Canada 1999). This growth in RRSP saving was a result of an increase in the number of
taxpayers making a contribution, rather than an increase in the average size of contributions. This is
illustrated in Figure 1, which displays some aggregate RRSP statistics from Revenue Canada (1984-
1992). The line graphs the percentage of those with earned income making a positive contribution.16
From 23.3 per cent in 1982, this RRSP participation rate grew to 31.7 per cent in 1990. The bars
show the size of the average contribution of those making a positive contribution, in constant 1990
dollars. The average contribution remained fairly steady throughout this period, reaching a peak
of $3,068 in 1988. The sharp drop in the average contribution in 1990 to $2,567 may have been
related to two reforms of RRSP contribution limits, each of which is described in detail below.
In 1990 and 1991, two reforms changed contribution limits. Starting in 1990, the roll-over
provisions for pension income were removed. This had a large eﬀect on the contribution room
available to pensioners, who represented 12.6 percent of tax ﬁlers in 1990.17 In 1991, a major
reform further changed the structure of contribution limits in three ways. First, the calculation of
the limit changed. The percentage of earned income used to calculate the limit decreased from 20
per cent to 18 per cent, and the maximum limit for those without an RPP increased from $7,500
to $11,500. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Before 1990, the maximum limit was reached at $37,500.
With the new percentage and higher maximum limit, the threshold is not reached until $63,889.
The cross-over point for the two contribution limit calculations is $41,667. So, among those without
an RPP, those with earned income over $41,667 experienced an increase in their limits, while those
earning under that threshold had a decrease. The second part of the reform changed the way the
limits of RPP members were calculated. Starting in 1991, RPP members calculated their limit
as 18 per cent of earned income up to $11,500, less a Pension Adjustment.18 The introduction of
the Pension Adjustment aﬀected RPP members, but not non-members.19 The ﬁnal feature of the
16Some taxﬁlers without earned income could still make contributions. See footnote 21 for more details on eligible
earned income for RRSP purposes. Deﬁning participation using the percentage of all taxﬁlers shows a similar trend.
17From 1989 to 1994, a special transitional provision allowed roll-overs of amounts up to $4000 into an RRSP in
the spouse’s name.
18The Pension Adjustment aimed to adjust the contribution limit to account for the tax preference given to the
accruing pension rights in the RPP (Horner and Poddar 1992). Because a uniform actuarial calculation is applied to
all RPPs, those with less generous plans receive an unduly large Pension Adjustment, while those with very generous
plans are assigned a Pension Adjustment that is less than the actuarial value of their accruing beneﬁts. The average
Pension Adjustment in 1993 (the ﬁrst year aggregate Pension Adjustments are reported), among those with a positive
Pension Adjustment, was $3,499 (Revenue Canada 1995).
19In 1991, 45.5 per cent of paid workers were members of an RPP (Statistics Canada 1999).
14reform was the introduction of a carry-forward provision. From 1991, unused contribution room
could be carried forward for use in future years.
3.1 Empirical Strategy
The model predicts that current RRSP contributions move inversely with future contribution
limits. This will be tested using the following reduced form equation:
RRSPi;t = LIMITi;t+1 + 0Xi;t + i + ui;t (28)
The contribution of individual i at time t, RRSPi;t, is expressed as a linear function of the con-
tribution limit in the next period, LIMITi;t+1, other relevant covariates, Xi;t, an individual ﬁxed
eﬀect, i, and a disturbance term, ui;t. Through subtraction of equation (28) written for period
t  1 from the same equation in period t, a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equation results:
∆RRSPi;t = ∆LIMITi;t+1 + 0∆Xi;t + "i;t: (29)
For each variable, the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator ∆ represents the diﬀerence between the realization
in one period and the realization in the preceding period. This facilitates the estimation of the
parameters  and  by removing the inﬂuence of the individual ﬁxed eﬀect i. The new disturbance
term "i;t replaces ∆ui;t, and is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero.
Some taxpayers will have their RRSP contribution censored. For some, the censoring occurs
because they are contributing at their contribution limit. To deal with this censoring, I assume
contributions are censored at the full value of the contribution limit. Gupta, Venti, and Wise (1994)
examine the possibility that, owing to rounding or integer considerations, individuals may be con-
strained by a “pseudo-limit” rather than the calculated statutory limit. For example, someone with
a calculated limit of $3,078 may decide to contribute only $3,000, in order to keep the contribution
at a round number. I check the sensitivity of the results to using a pseudo-limit as the censoring
point by reporting the results of a regression with contributions censored at a 90 per cent of the
actual limit.
The RRSP contributions of other taxpayers will be censored on the other side. The maximum
withdrawal that could be made from an RRSP would be to liquidate the account. This means that
the maximum withdrawal ranges from zero (if the taxpayer did not have an RRSP) to the total
15accumulated stock of RRSP assets. Unfortunately, the data set does not report the accumulated
stock of RRSP assets, so the true censoring point is unobservable. For the main regressions,
I therefore assume that there is no accumulated stock of RRSP assets from which a withdrawal
could be made, which means that the RRSP contribution is censored at zero. I check the sensitivity
of the results by taking the opposite assumption that any size withdrawal could be made, so RRSP
contributions are not censored on the left.
To account for the censoring of the dependent variable, I follow Wise (1984) and estimate (29)
as a Tobit. I assume that the level of RRSP contributions are censored on the left at zero, and on
the right at the contemporaneous contribution limit:
0  RRSPi;t  LIMITi;t (30)
The censoring points for the change in RRSP contributions at time t can be found by subtracting
the contribution made in period t  1:
RRSPi;t1  ∆RRSPi;t  LIMITi;t  RRSPi;t1 (31)
Because contribution limits are a function of income, the 1990 and 1991 reforms to contribution
limits are crucial for identifying the eﬀect of future contribution limits. I deﬁne four groups of
taxpayers who receive diﬀerent treatment under the reform, and compare their contributions with
the contributions of taxpayers outside the four groups. If the contributions of members of the
groups react diﬀerently to the changes in contribution limits brought about by the reforms than
do the contribution of taxpayers outside the groups, then a more credible inference can be made
about the causal link between future contribution limits and current contributions. The deﬁnition
of the treatment groups is discussed in the next section.
This empirical strategy raises some ground for caution. Observed responses to the reform more
likely reﬂect the reaction to the change in the lifetime total future contribution room, rather than
the one-year change in contribution room as I assume here. To calculate the change in lifetime
contribution room would require strong assumptions about the future paths of income and policy.20
20The same criticism could be levied against the assumption that consumers know their one-year forward contri-
bution limit. However, RRSP contributions can be made up to 60 days into the next tax year. So, consumers will
already be in the “future” year when making the contribution decision for the “present” year. Furthermore, in the
case of each reform, the new limit structure for the coming year was known well before the deadline for contributions
for the current tax year. (Bill C-52, which contained amendments to the RRSP sections of the Income Tax Act
16So, the one-year change in future contribution limits serves here as a proxy for the total change
in expected future contribution limits, to which contributions in fact may be responding. For this
reason, interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated response is diﬃcult.
3.2 Data
I examine contribution behaviour using administrative data on a random sample of Canadian tax
ﬁlers. This panel follows the same set of tax ﬁlers through the years 1987 to 1991. Only those
who ﬁle a tax return in a given year appear in the data set. From this data set, I exclude those
ineligible to contribute to an RRSP in a given year. Ineligibility occurs when age exceeds 71, or
when the year’s RRSP contribution limit is zero. Finally, I removed any tax ﬁler making a transfer
of a retirement allowance or lump sum into an RRSP because of diﬃculty in distinguishing the
type of transfer.21 The construction of the desired variables requires information from one year
forward and one year back. Accordingly, observations for 1987 and 1991 could not be used because
of the inability to create these variables. The data set used for estimation takes the form of an
unbalanced panel with 41,764 observations for 1988, 41,801 for 1989, and 39,556 for 1990.22
The primary advantage of administrative data is the ability to calculate the desired variables
with greater accuracy than is possible using survey data. The actual RRSP contribution made
by the taxpayer, RRSPi;t, is reported in the data set. The dependent variable for the regressions,
∆RRSPi;t, is then constructed using the diﬀerence of RRSPi;t and RRSPi;t1 for each individual.
The calculation of the RRSP contribution limit LIMITi;t requires several pieces of information.
First, I must distinguish between members and non-members of RPPs. For 1990 and 1991, RPP
members are distinguished by having a non-zero Pension Adjustment. Unfortunately, RPP status
before 1990 is unobservable.23 To assign RPP status for prior years, I assume that those who are
members of RPPs in 1990 were also members from 1987 to 1989. Once RPP status is determined,
the next step is to combine this with a measure of earned income in order to arrive at the RRSP
reﬂecting the reforms implemented for 1991, received Royal Assent on June 27, 1990.) This renders plausible the
assumption that a contributor has enough information about both earnings and tax regulations to predict his limit
for the coming year when current contributions are made.
21Some transfers appear as income and then later are deducted. Other transfers appear neither as income nor as a
deduction. This ambiguity made the measurement of the year’s contribution imprecise. Results from regressions on
a data set including these observations produced comparable results.
22Regressions on a balanced panel including only those tax ﬁlers eligible to contribute in all ﬁve years showed
similar results.
23Only employee contributions to an RPP are observed before 1990. Those in non-contributory pension plans are
indistinguishable from those with no RPP.
17contribution limit. From 1987 to 1989 earned income is constructed from the reported components
of income.24 In 1990 and 1991, the exact earned income for RRSP purposes is provided in the data
set. This calculated value of earned income is then used to derive the RRSP contribution limit.
Finally, for years prior to 1990, pension income could be rolled into an RRSP, which eﬀectively
increased the contribution limit by the amount of pension income received. Thus, the calculated
value of LIMITi;t used in the estimation comprises the sum of the contribution limit derived from
earned income and eligible pension income. To calculate ∆LIMITi;t+1, I subtract next year’s limit
LIMITi;t+1 from this year’s limit LIMITi;t.
There are four groups of taxpayers who receive diﬀerent treatment under the reforms. First,
RPP members had their RRSP contribution limit change with the introduction of the Pension
Adjustment for the 1991 tax year. Those who were not members of RPPs did not experience
this change in their limit calculation. Second, pension income recipients saw their ability to roll
over income into an RRSP curtailed in 1990. This reform did not aﬀect those without pension
income. Third, the increase in the maximum limit from $7500 to $11500 in 1991 aﬀected only
those with high contribution limits. Those with lower levels of earned income actually saw a
small decrease in their contribution limit as the percentage of earned income used in the limit
calculation decreased from 20 to 18 per cent. Finally, the model predicts that those who are
constrained in period t + 1 will change their contribution in period t in response to a change
in the contribution limit in period t + 1. Those who are not constrained in the future period,
however, are not predicted to show any response. For this reason, I identify the group of taxpayers
whose future RRSP contribution was constrained by the contribution limit. These four groups of
taxpayers have the value 1 assigned to the variables RPPMEM, PENSIONER, HIGHLIMIT,
and FUTCONSTRD. More detail about the construction of these variables, as well as the other
control variables used in the regressions, is provided in Appendix B.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the key variables in the data set. The ﬁrst three columns
calculate the statistics over all the observations for each year. The rest of the columns report the
same statistics for members of each of the treatment groups. The average RRSP contribution falls
slightly from 1988 to 1989 to $997, then drops sharply in 1990 to $702. There is also a decrease
24Before 1990, earned income for RRSP purposes comprised the sum of T4 income, other employment income,
Old Age Security pension income, Canada/Quebec Pension Plan income, other pension income, net rental income,
net business income, net professional income, net farming income, and net ﬁshing income. From 1990, the deﬁnition
excluded Old Age Security pension income, Canada/Quebec Pension Plan income, and other pension income.
18in contribution room available in that year, so the response seen in the mean RRSP contribution
may be related. Much of this drop is attributable to the cessation of pension income roll-overs
by pension recipients. This is conﬁrmed by looking at the third panel which reports the statistics
for the subsample of pension income recipients. Both the average RRSP contribution and average
contribution limit fall greatly in 1990 for members of this group. The number of pensioners in the
data set also drops in 1990 to 3608. This occurs because the RRSP contribution limit of many
pension income recipients became zero once pension income roll-overs were disallowed.
The next two rows compare the mean of ∆RRSPi;t to the mean of ∆LIMITi;t+1. On average
over all observations, RRSP contributions grew in 1989 by $28. The average change in the RRSP
contribution limit in the coming year for these taxpayers was -$1473. This large drop in the con-
tribution limit is driven mostly by the group of pension income recipients, whose limits fell greatly.
The subsample of taxpayers whose future RRSP contribution was constrained show a clear pattern
in the means for these two variables. In 1988 and 1989 when future limits are becoming smaller,
RRSP contributions are growing. In 1990 however, their future contribution limits increased by
$884 due to the 1991 reforms. In that year, the average contribution by these taxpayers dropped
by $447. These means reveal some preliminary evidence of a negative relationship between current
RRSP contributions and future RRSP contribution limits. The regressions in the next section ex-
pand on this analysis by controlling for other individual characteristics that may inﬂuence RRSP
contributions, as well as taking into account the censoring of the dependent variable.
3.3 Results
I report regression results for a series of speciﬁcations. After conﬁrming the existence of a simple
relationship between current contributions and future limits, I progressively add more control vari-
ables for income and demographic characteristics. Next, I add the dummy variables for the four
treatment groups as well as interactions of these variables with the policy variable, ∆LIMITi;t+1.
Finally, I check the result for robustness using diﬀerent subsamples and varying the deﬁnition of the
key RRSP variables. A consistent picture emerges from the analysis. The results show a strong,
negative relationship between future limits and current contributions, which is consistent with the
prediction of Proposition 1.
Table 3 reports the base regression results. Beneath each coeﬃcient appears the corresponding
standard error. The standard errors are derived from the Huber-White robust variance-covariance
19matrix, which adjusts for arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity. Wald tests for signiﬁcance of the
estimated coeﬃcients are chi-squared distributed with one degree of freedom. Those variables
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level are indicated with an asterisk. To begin, speciﬁcation (a)
shows the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of ∆RRSPi;t on ∆LIMITi;t+1.
The estimated coeﬃcient is a signiﬁcant 0:119. This provides some initial evidence of a negative
relationship between the two variables provides. However, this OLS estimate does not account
for the censoring of the dependent variable. The Tobit estimate in speciﬁcation (b) improves on
the OLS speciﬁcation by taking the censoring of contributions into account. In the data, 25;929
observations are uncensored, 89;972 observations are censored on the left, and 7;220 are censored
on the right. The estimated coeﬃcient for the Tobit speciﬁcation is 0:190. This estimate implies
that a $1;000 increase in the future limit leads to a decrease in current contributions of $190 for
an unconstrained contributor. However, as noted earlier, a taxpayer’s current contributions may
be reacting not only to the change in the limit in the coming period, but also to the total change
in contribution room over all future periods. For this reason, interpretation of the magnitude of
the response should be made with caution.
Contribution limits are a function of income. To ensure that the observed negative relationship
between future limits and current contributions is not simply reﬂecting changes in income, I explore
a speciﬁcation including measures of income. The best measure of the resources available to an
individual would be his or her after-tax income. However, RRSP contributions change the tax
liability of the individual, so after-tax income is endogenous. Instead, I recalculate the individual’s
tax liability as if there were no RRSP contribution to derive an after-tax, but before RRSP,
income. This calculation also provides the marginal tax rate facing the individual before RRSP
contributions are made.25
Speciﬁcation (c) includes both current and future income, as well as marginal tax rates. The
square of current and future income is also included. These variables all appear in ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
form. The coeﬃcient on ∆LIMITt+1 is now 0:232, which is larger than in speciﬁcation (b).
Income is measured in units of one thousand dollars, meaning that the coeﬃcient of 12:15 implies
that a thousand dollar increase in income leads to a $12:15 increase in the RRSP contribution.
So, those with higher incomes save more through RRSPs than those with lower incomes, which is
25Triest (1998) argues that this ﬁrst-dollar marginal tax rate may still be endogenous if RRSP contributions
change reported income or the use of other tax deductions. This endogeneity will bias the estimated coeﬃcient on
the marginal tax rate toward zero.
20consistent with Proposition 2. However, the estimated coeﬃcient on future income is 14:39, which
conﬂicts with the prediction of Proposition 3. The marginal tax rate is measured as a percentage
between zero and one hundred. So, the estimated coeﬃcient of 16:88 means that a ten percentage
point increase in the marginal tax rate faced by the consumer increases the contribution by $168:80.
This is consistent with the positive relationship between marginal tax rates and Individual Retire-
ment Account contributions reported by Long (1990), but diﬀers from Veall (1999), who ﬁnds no
evidence that higher marginal tax rates increase RRSP contributions. The coeﬃcient on the future
marginal tax rate is also positive. All else equal, a higher future marginal tax rate increases the
beneﬁt to the taxpayer of tax-exempt accrual on current contributions, but should also increase the
desire of the taxpayer to abstain from current contributions in order to smooth marginal tax rates
between the two years. Overall, this speciﬁcation conﬁrms that the observed negative coeﬃcient
on ∆LIMITt+1 is not caused by correlations of limits with tax rates and income.
Speciﬁcation (d) augments the regression by adding trends for several demographic character-
istics reported in the data set. The positive estimated coeﬃcients on MALE and MARD suggest
that males and married individuals increased their RRSP contributions on average over the sample
period. The variables AGE and AGESQ taken together form a quadratic in the individual’s age.
The estimated coeﬃcients of 593:98 and 6:46 imply that the time trend in RRSP contributions
is decreasing with age, and that this trend is positive and increasing for individuals under 46 years
of age, and decreasing thereafter. The administrative data also provides some information on the
individual’s type of employment. Three of these four income source dummies are insigniﬁcant,
however. The regression also includes provincial trend variables, to pick up changes in contribution
patterns speciﬁc to residents of a province. Finally, the variables Y 1989 and Y 1990 are indicators to
pick up the overall trend from 1988 to 1989, and 1989 to 1990. With these trend variables included,
the coeﬃcient on the future limit is larger, at a statistically signiﬁcant 0:320. This suggests that
the result is robust to the inclusion of controls for this set of observable trends.
In order to exploit the existence of the four groups receiving diﬀerent treatment under the
reform, I create dummy variables for membership in each of the groups along with interactions
of this set of dummies with ∆LIMITt+1. The results of regressions including these variables are
reported in Table 4. Speciﬁcation (e) includes the regressors used in speciﬁcation (d), with the
addition of the set of treatment group dummies as controls. Because pensioners, for example,
received diﬀerent treatment through the reform period, the estimated coeﬃcient on ∆LIMITt+1
21may pick up other trends aﬀecting the RRSP contributions of pensioners diﬀerently than those
of non-pensioners. With these variables included, I can control for the eﬀect of any linear trends
for the treatment groups. The estimated coeﬃcient in speciﬁcation (e) is 0:308, which is slightly
smaller in absolute value than the coeﬃcient reported for speciﬁcation (d). This suggests that the
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of future limits on RRSP contributions in these regressions does not rely
on diﬀerences across groups.
Speciﬁcation (f) extends the regression in speciﬁcation (e) by including the interaction terms
described above. This speciﬁcation permits heterogeneity across the treatment groups in the re-
sponse of contributions to limits. The estimated eﬀect of future limits on taxpayers in none of
the treatment groups is now an insigniﬁcant 0:053. Because these taxpayers in the control group
received little change to their contribution limits, this is expected. In contrast, the coeﬃcients on
three of the four interaction terms are negative and signiﬁcant. RPP members show a stronger
reaction to the reform than non-members, with an estimated coeﬃcient for this group of 0:161.
Pensioners show the strongest reaction to a change in their limits, with an estimated coeﬃcient of
0:287. Those with high contribution limits have an estimated coeﬃcient of 0:103, although it
is insigniﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Finally, the theory predicted a reaction only for those who
are constrained in the future. In the data, these individuals do show a signiﬁcant negative response
with an estimated coeﬃcient of 0:093. Thus, members of three of the four treatment groups show
a statistically signiﬁcant stronger response to changes in their future contribution limits than do
those outside the treatment group.
Finally, Table 5 presents estimates from four regressions using diﬀerent sample and variable
deﬁnitions. In the ﬁrst two columns, I report results from regressions identical to speciﬁcation (e)
on observations from 1989 only and 1990 only. The 1989-only sample isolates the eﬀect of the
1990 contribution limit reform on 1989 RRSP contributions, while the 1990-only sample looks at
the eﬀect of the 1991 reform on 1990 RRSP contributions. In both cases, the coeﬃcient on the
future limit is statistically signiﬁcant and negative. The estimated magnitude of the eﬀect in 1990,
is much smaller than in 1989: 0:089 compared to 0:243. However, the negative relationship
between current contributions and future limits holds in each of these subsamples. To check the
assumptions made about the censoring points, I explore a diﬀerent deﬁnition of contributions and
limits. The regression reported in column (i) uses a taxpayer’s net contribution to RRSPs. Rather
than assuming that no withdrawals are possible, here I assume that a taxpayer can withdraw
22as much as he would like from the RRSP account. If zero contributions are observed, then the
taxpayer is assumed to prefer making this level of contribution over making a withdrawal. With
this extreme assumption, the estimated coeﬃcient on ∆LIMITi;t+1 is closer to zero at 0:160, but
is still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Finally, I apply the pseudo-limit concept of Gupta, Venti,
and Wise (1994) by censoring contributions at 90 per cent of the year’s limit.26 The results are
reported in column (i). The estimated coeﬃcient here is almost unchanged from speciﬁcation (e), at
a signiﬁcant 0:301. Comparing the results from changing assumptions about the left-hand and the
right-hand limits, it appears that the assumption about those contributing zero to RRSPs is much
more important to the Tobit estimation than is the assumption about the right censoring point
at the contribution limit. These regressions show that the negative relationship between RRSP
contributions and future contribution limits is remarkably robust across variations in samples and
variable deﬁnitions.
4 Conclusion
This paper developed a simple life-cycle model to describe the path of contributions to tax-preferred
savings accounts when contributions are subject to contribution limits. The solution to this model
diﬀers from existing models by featuring a use-it-or-lose-it eﬀect on contributions. This leads to a
new result - as limits increase current contributions will decrease. The model also provides insight
into contribution behaviour in the presence of a carry-forward provision. Under this institution,
the use-it-or-lose-it motivation is diminished, and under certain parameter values could disappear.
The empirical evidence draws from reforms to RRSP limits in Canada, and supports the primary
proposition of the model. Increased contribution limits are associated with a decrease in contribu-
tions.
This model improves on existing models of contribution behaviour, but remains incomplete.
A model incorporating uncertainty about incomes and future tax rates, precautionary savings,
or liquidity constraints might provide richer conclusions about allocations of saving across assets
receiving diﬀerent tax treatment. Instead, this model emphasizes the importance of thinking about
limit changes in a life-cycle context. By providing an improved framework in which to interpret
results, this model should aid empirical researchers interested in understanding the real eﬀects
26A 95 percent pseudo-limit was also tried, and similar results were obtained.
23of tax-preferred savings accounts on saving, as well as policy makers interested in predicting the
response to a change in contribution limits.
24A Proofs
In order to sign the required derivatives, the Jacobian of F with respect to x must be evaluated.
Deﬁne rxF as the matrix composed of the derivatives of identities F1, F2 and F3 with respect to
the set of choice variables x = fR1;N1;N2g.
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Given the assumption of strictly concave utility, each term in the expansion of the determinant
is negative. Since each individual term is negative, the sum of all the terms must be negative:
jrxFj < 0.
￿
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Deﬁne rL2F as the matrix of ﬁrst derivatives of identities F1, F2 and F3 with respect to L2. The
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
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RRSP - The amount contributed to an RRSP, comprising regular contributions and roll-overs of
pension income into own or spousal RRSP. Inﬂated to 1990 dollars.
LIMIT - Sum of earned income derived limit and income eligible for pension roll-over. Earned
income part of limit for RPP members, 1988 to 1990: the minimum of 20% of earned income and
$3500, less employee contribution to RPP. Earned income part of limit for those without RPPs,
1988 to 1990: the minimum of 20% of earned income and $7500. Earned income part of limit for
both RPP members and non-members, 1991: minimum of 18% of earned income and $11,500, less
any Pension Adjustment for RPP members. Inﬂated to 1990 dollars.
INCOME - Reported taxable income, less taxes owing on income without any RRSP contri-
bution.
MTR - Marginal income tax rate on next dollar of income, calculated without any RRSP
contribution.
MALE - Takes the value 1 for males; 0 for females.
MARD - Takes the value 1 for those who report a legal spouse; 0 otherwise.
CHLDRN - Number of children reported for child tax beneﬁt calculations.
AGE - Calculated as current year less year of birth.
Y 1989 - Year dummy for 1989.
Y 1990 - Year dummy for 1990.
BUSDUM - Takes the value 1 for those reporting nonzero business income; 0 otherwise.
COMMDUM - Takes the value 1 for those reporting nonzero commission income; 0 otherwise.
FARMDUM - Takes the value 1 for those reporting nonzero farming income; 0 otherwise.
FISHDUM - Takes the value 1 for those reporting nonzero ﬁshing income; 0 otherwise.
NF;PEI;NS;NB;QUE;MAN;SAS;ALB;BC;TERR - Takes the value 1 for residents of
Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
Alberta, British Columbia, and the Northwest or Yukon Territories, respectively; 0 otherwise.
RPPMEM - For 1990 and 1991, takes the value 1 for those reporting a positive Pension
Adjustment. For 1988 and 1989, each taxpayer’s RPP status from 1990 is assigned.
PENSIONER - Takes the value 1 if reported pension income is positive; 0 otherwise.
HIGHLIMIT - Takes the value 1 if calculated RRSP contribution limit exceeds $7500 in
31years 1988 to 1990, and $11500 in 1991; 0 otherwise.
FUTCONSTRD - Takes the value 1 for year t if taxpayer is deemed to be constrained in year
t + 1; 0 otherwise. Taxpayer is deemed to be constrained in the future year if the observed RRSP
contribution in year t + 1 meets or exceeds the contribution limit for year t + 1 calculated using
the limit calculation rules for year t. This captures the desired set of taxpayers - those who would
have been constrained had the limit calculation rules not changed.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
OLS TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT
CONSTANT -90.55 * -3128.63 * -3201.81 -15890.46
(15.63) (19.56) (20.21) (418.38)
DLIMIT i,t+1 -0.119 * -0.190 * -0.232 * -0.320 *
(0.033) (0.190) (0.002) (0.003)
DINCOME i,t 12.15 * 14.70 *
(1.06) (1.29)
DINCOMESQ i,t 0.015 * -0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
DINCOME i,t+1 -14.39 * -7.193 *
(1.89) (2.137)
DINCOMESQ i,t+1 0.036 * 0.017 *
(0.007) (0.008)
DMTR i,t 16.88 * 19.12 *
(1.68) (2.32)
























Continued on Next Page
37Table 3 (continued)
(a) (b) (c) (d)



















Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates significant at the five per cent
 level are indicated with an asterisk.
38Table 4
Regression Results - with Interactions
(e) (f)
TOBIT TOBIT
DLIMIT i,t+1 -0.308 * 0.053
(0.003) (0.032)
DLIMIT i,t+1*RPPMEM -0.161 *
(0.071)




DLIMIT i,t+1*FUTCONSTRD -0.093 *
(0.022)
RPPMEM 926.59 * 804.05 *
(60.99) (61.03)
PENSIONER -1188.72 * -1298.67 *
(115.37) (118.58)
HIGHLIMIT 2939.30 * 2736.78 *
(80.86) (80.94)
FUTCONSTRD 2979.70 * 2950.37 *
(48.42) (51.20)
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates 
significant at the five per cent level are indicated with an asterisk.
Also included in these regressions but not reported is the set of
control variables used in specification (d).
39Table 5
Sensitivity Analysis
(g) (h) (i) (j)
TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT
1989 1990 Net RRSP 90%
DLIMIT i,t+1 -0.243 * -0.089 * -0.160 * -0.301 *
(0.014) (0.030) (0.016) (0.002)
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Estimates significant at the
five per cent level are indicated with an asterisk.  Also included in these
regressions but not reported is the set of control variables used in
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